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The Future of Many Contracts
Victor P. Goldberg*
Forty years ago, my former colleague, the late Ian Macneil, pub-
lished an article entitled The Many Futures of Contracts.' When I
was asked to contribute to this symposium on what contract law
might look like in 2025, the play on words was too good to resist.
Professor Macneil developed the notion of "relational contracts,"
emphasizing the limits of classical contract law in dealing with
long-term contractual relations. His work had a strong influence
on scholarship, including my work. The notion that many contrac-
tual relationships are long-lived and require some form of adapta-
tion as circumstances change and new information becomes avail-
able is a powerful one, one that was not well appreciated in classi-
cal contract law.
Law evolves slowly and doctrine has not changed much since
Macneil wrote. And, I suspect, contract law a decade from now
will not look very different from today. So, rather than predict, I
will discuss some concerns I have with the doctrine as it stands
today with the hope of nudging the law in a different direction.
Contract law is facilitative. As a first principle, parties should
be free to define their obligations. For sophisticated parties it
means that their words should be taken seriously. My first con-
cern is with doctrines that tend to undermine the written docu-
ment, for example, the watering down of the parol evidence and
plain meaning rules. Other problematic doctrines include the ex-
pansive use of custom, usage, and course of performance as mani-
fested in decisions like Columbia Nitrogen2 and Nanakuli, and
the liberal application of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing to trump the contract language. I am not insisting on
an absolutist position, but I do believe that the spirit of the Uni-
form Commercial Code ("UCC") and the tone of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts go too far in their willingness to go beyond
* Jerome L. Greene Professor of Transactional Law, Columbia Law School.
1. Ian Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 691 (1974).
2. Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971). For a critical
analysis of the case, see VICTOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE ch. 7 (2006).
3. Nanakuli Paving and Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., Inc., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1982).
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the written document. They put more faith in the role of judges
and juries ex post than in transactional lawyers ex ante.
Contract performance takes place over time, and a significant
question is how the obligations should be adapted as circumstanc-
es change and new information becomes available. I want to con-
sider the implications of these realities for two doctrinal problems:
remedies and quantity flexibility. It is instructive to think of
these problems as exercises in contract design. Doctrine is, or
should be, only about default rules, and the manner in which par-
ties design their relationships should provide insights into how
those default rules should be structured. The starting point
should be recognition of the tradeoff between the parties' desire
for the flexibility to adapt as new information becomes available
and their desire to rely upon the continuation of the relationship.
If the contract grants one party the flexibility to adapt, the coun-
terparty might want to confront it with a price that would reflect
the costs the counterparty would incur by granting that discretion.
One possible response to changed circumstances is to terminate
the agreement. When designing their relationship, the parties
might include an option to terminate for one or both parties. The
option might be unconditional, or it might be exercisable only in
certain circumstances. The counterparty might want to impose a
hurdle to protect its reliance upon the continuation of their ar-
rangement. The more it would be hurt by termination, the greater
the price the counterparty would put on the option to abandon.
Termination would not be a breach of the agreement; it would be
an agreed-upon term.
If we treat breach as the exercise of an option to terminate, then
we can view the remedy for breach as the price of that option.
How should that option be priced? Framing the question in this
manner has implications for how we should approach the issue of
contract remedies. Farnsworth states the traditional view: "The
basic principle for the measurement of those damages is that of
compensation based on the injured party's expectation. One is
entitled to recover an amount that will put one in as good a posi-
tion as one would have been in had the contract been performed."4
But why? Would parties typically choose to price the termination
4. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.8,188-89 (2d ed., vol. 3
1990).
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option that way?' The answer is probably "yes," if it only meant
compensating the non-terminating party with the contract-market
differential. But the "make-them-whole" remedy often goes well
beyond the price differential, and in those situations, parties often
opt for something other than the promisee's expectations. The
exercise price for the option to terminate need not have any rela-
tionship to the legal remedies of the UCC or Restatement. To
shed light on this, consider how parties explicitly price the termi-
nation option in different contexts.
Consider two classes of agreements in which the price of the op-
tion to abandon is essentially zero, despite the fact that the coun-
terparty places considerable reliance on the continuation of the
relationship. First, a venture capitalist ("VC") provides funds to
an entrepreneur for a project that typically has a high risk of fail-
ure and a long period before it would yield positive profits. Typi-
cally, the contract gives the VC an option to abandon and a right
of first refusal. The option to abandon is valuable to the VC, but it
is costly for the entrepreneur since the VC could always use the
option to rewrite the deal opportunistically in a way more favora-
ble to it. Moreover, the first refusal right limits the entrepre-
neur's access to alternative funding sources. An outsider must
realize that the original VC's failure to exercise the first refusal
right would mean that it has overbid; therefore, the outsider
would probably choose to forgo the opportunity. The entrepreneur
is thus vulnerable to the possible opportunistic threat of termina-
tion. What protection does the entrepreneur include in the con-
tract? Typically, none. The option price is zero; the entrepre-
neur's protection would be non-contractual, primarily the reputa-
tion concern of the VC.
Second, the automobile franchise relationship, before it was en-
shrouded in legislative protections for franchisees, gave the manu-
facturers a cancellation option at a nominal price, or, in some in-
stances, at a zero price. The Ford franchise contract pre-1940 was
legally unenforceable, which, in effect, meant that either party
could walk away costlessly. In Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co.,' the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found
the franchise agreement to be illusory, despite the claimed reli-
5. Scott and Triantis have written an important paper arguing against the compensa-
tion principle as the appropriate remedy for breach of contract. See Robert E. Scott &
George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract
Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428 (2004).
6. 116 F.2d 675 (2d. Cir. 1940).
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ance of the dealer on alleged oral statements by Ford representa-
tives:
[Diefendant's settled policy was 'Once a Ford dealer, always a
Ford dealer'; that by the dealership contract 'the plaintiff had
become a member of the great Ford family; that the plaintiff
would remain a Ford dealer as long as it wanted to'; that the
Ford policy, settled for many years, 'was a guarantee of this;
and that the plaintiff need have no hesitation whatever in in-
vesting all available funds in the promotion of the sale and
servicing of Ford products as such investments would be per-
fectly safe.' . . . [P]laintiff was encouraged to enlarge its facil-
ities, increase its sales force and expand its business, in reli-
ance on the assurances given by the defendant that plaintiff
was 'in' as a Ford dealer as long as it wanted and should have
no concern over the wisdom of making long term commit-
ments and long term plans.
Ford wanted its dealers to make investments in reliance on con-
tinuation of the relationship, and, by and large, dealers did so.
The dealers could not rely on the contract language since it was
unenforceable; they relied instead on the expectation that their
satisfactory performance would assure the renewal of their fran-
chise. Dealers wanted more, but, absent legislative intervention,
they could not get the producers to give explicit protection to their
reliance.'
In other contexts, the option price can be substantial. The con-
tract between the movie studio and the actor, for example, in-
cludes a "pay-or-play" clause.' If it were to receive new infor-
mation between the time the contract is signed and the time the
movie is completed, the studio could terminate. In effect, the pay-
or-play clause fixes a price for this termination option. For major
talent, it would be the so-called "fixed fee," which might be in the
$20 million range. For lesser talent, the fee would be smaller, and
the right to compensation might not be triggered until the occur-
rence of some subsequent event, perhaps the receipt of a bona fide
outside offer. The option price would reflect the fact that the actor
7. Id. at 678.
8. Since passage of the Dealers Day in Court Act of 1956, automobile franchise agree-
ments that were not enforceable or were terminable on short notice have been prohibited;
see STEWART MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER: THE AUTOMOBILE
MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR DEALERS, 61-71(1966).
9. See GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at ch. 15.
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has set aside a particular time period in which it can no longer
accept alternative projects. The more attractive these alterna-
tives, the greater the option price.
In corporate acquisitions the agreements often include options
to walk away, sometimes with the option price being made explic-
it. Sellers of public corporations typically have the right to reject
the deal by paying a breakup fee, usually around 3% of the deal
price.o Buyers will usually have a right to walk away from the
deal if there is a material breach of the seller's representations
and warranties or if there is a material adverse change ("MAC").
Some agreements also allow the buyer to terminate by paying a
breakup fee. The fee could be made contingent upon specific facts.
For example, in one recently litigated case, the contract allowed
the buyer to pay a breakup fee of $325 million if the deal could not
close despite the buyer's best efforts." If, however, the deal failed
to close because of a "knowing and intentional breach of any cove-
nant," the damages would be uncapped.12 The vice chancellor
found that the buyer and its lawyers had committed a number of
bad acts and that the breach of the covenant was intentional.13
The buyer settled for $1 billion, roughly three times the breakup
fee.14
The option perspective on breach of contract was set out over a
century ago by Oliver Wendell Holmes: the "duty to keep a con-
tract at common law means a prediction that you must pay dam-
ages if you do not keep it-and nothing else."" If the contract
were silent on what should happen if one party were to terminate,
the option price would be set by the default remedy. This charac-
terization is sometimes referred to as "efficient breach," terminol-
ogy that I find to be unfortunate. The more general statement is
"efficient adaptation to changed conditions," with one subset of
adaptations being termination. The notion that a party has an
option to perform or terminate does not sit well with many com-
mentators who regard breach as immoral. Daniel Friedmann has
been a particularly vocal- proponent of this position." There is
10. See David Fox, Breakup Fees -Picking Your Number, THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Sept. 11, 2012, 9:03
AM), https://blogs.law.harvard.edulcorpgov/2012/09/11/breakup-fees-picking-your-number/.
11. Hexion Specialty Chem., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008).
12. Id. at 724.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 746.
15. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
16. Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989).
Summer 2014 327
Duquesne Law Review
nothing immoral, however, about a voluntary agreement that
would allow one party to terminate, perhaps for a price, if certain
circumstances arose. Indeed, even Professor Friedmann would be
comfortable with parties contracting over a termination remedy;
his moral indignation only goes as far as the default rule."
The fundamental point is that the default contract law remedy
is, in effect, the implied termination clause, and it should be
viewed as just another contract term from which parties are free
to vary. The remedy default rule, however, is stickier than others.
The stickiness of the expectation damage remedy has great rhetor-
ical power. If a breacher is perceived as having wronged the
promisee, then corrective justice would seem to require that, like a
tort victim, the promisee should be made whole. "The fundamen-
tal principle that the law's goal on breach of contract is not to de-
ter breach by compelling the promisor to perform, but rather to
redress breach by compensating the promisee."" That provides an
anchor for doctrinal argument and friction for moving away from
the default remedies. I am suggesting that it is time to lift that
anchor.
Reframing the problem as a matter of transaction design and
recognizing the reliance-flexibility tradeoff shows why the benefit
of the bargain remedy is too simplistic. Holmes's framing as the
promisor having a choice between performing or paying damages
was, in large part, a response to the notion that default rules
should be derived from ethical norms rather than commercial
needs. Reviving Holmes's aphorism would at least nudge the
rhetoric in a more useful direction. The evidence from the design
decisions of contracting parties indicates that the price of termina-
tion often bears no resemblance to the redress remedy. Decou-
pling the pricing of the termination option from the question of
compensation can lead to a more nuanced approach to contract
remedies.
I will give one illustration of a remedy doctrine that makes no
economic sense and which could plausibly disappear within the
next decade: the lost volume seller remedy embodied in UCC § 2-
708(2). The problem in the retailing context is a simple one. A
customer orders a consumer durable, such as a car. Before deliv-
ery, the customer cancels the order (a breach). The retailer sells
the same car to another customer at the same price. The retailer
17. Id. at 23.
18. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, at §12.18.
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then sues the customer for breach. The customer argues that
since the contract price and cover price were the same, the retail-
er's damages were zero. The retailer responds by claiming that it
would have sold the second car anyway, so it would have made the
profit on each of the cars. The profit would be the difference be-
tween the contract price and the but-for cost, which, in the retail
context, is the difference between the retail and wholesale price-
the gross margin.
That is the solution embodied in UCC § 2-708(2). The resolution
gets more complicated as various difficulties are considered.
Would the second buyer have bought only this car? Would the re-
tailer be able to sell additional cars at the same cost? All of these
complications are irrelevant if the problem is reframed in terms of
the option price. This remedy in effect sets the customer's option
price at the gross margin-roughly 12-15%of the retail price. That
is, the customer agrees to pay $3,000 for the option to pay an addi-
tional $17,000 to buy a car with a retail price of $20,000. Even
assuming customers are aware of this, is there any reason to be-
lieve that they would agree to such a bargain? The possibility that
a customer might order a car and then change her mind is a cost
of doing business for the retailer. Moreover, the retailer can influ-
ence the likelihood of a cancellation. In particular, it could set an
explicit option price in the form of a non-refundable deposit. The
higher the deposit, the less likely the cancellation. Under what
conditions would a consumer agree to a substantial deposit? If, for
example, the car model is a hot seller, manufacturers might have
to allocate the cars amongst their dealers; even if a dealer had po-
tential buyers for more than, say, twenty cars a month, it could
not sell to all of them. The option price as reckoned by the lost
volume formula would be zero-the dealer could not have sold an-
other car. That, however, is precisely the situation in which the
customer might rationally choose to pay a substantial option price.
Conversely, if demand were slack, the formula would result in an
option price equal to the gross margin, whereas the contract would
likely set an option price at, or near, zero. UCC § 2-708(2) gets it
backward.
Termination is an extreme form of adaptation to change. Less
extreme would be variation of quantity. That raises a second set
of concerns about doctrine. UCC § 2-306(1) purports to deal with
the problem by using "good faith" to define obligations. This, I
would suggest, is a big mistake. It again reflects the Code draft-
ers' failure to understand basic economics and their lack of faith in
Summer 2014 329
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transactional lawyers. The basic problem, simply put, is that in a
long-term contractual relationship, supply and demand conditions
are likely to change and the parties will want to adapt as new in-
formation becomes available. In some instances, the adaptation
mechanism would entail an elaborate governance system. In oth-
ers, it would entail giving one party control. As with the analysis
of termination, the parties' discretion need not be unbounded. The
party with discretion can be confronted with a price reflecting the
counterparty's reliance.
UCC § 2-306(1) explicitly addresses "full output" and "require-
ments" contracts. In the former, the quantity decision is at the
discretion of the seller. The buyer agrees to take whatever the
seller chooses to produce. In the latter, the quantity decision is at
the discretion of the buyer. The seller agrees to provide whatever
the buyer chooses to order. If the discretion were completely un-
bounded, such an agreement could be disastrous. If the market
price rose even one cent above the contract price, the buyer could
claim requirements thousands of times its normal needs. Fear of
this possibility led the drafters of the Code to cap the discretion by
imposing a good faith limitation. The poster-child case for ex-
treme quantity variation is Oscar Schlegel Manufacturing Co. v.
Peter Cooper's Glue Factory." When the market price more than
doubled the contract price, the buyer increased its purchases more
than tenfold.20 The parties might be quite eager to constrain such
opportunistic behavior.
Unfortunately, the UCC throws out the baby with the bath-
water. It purports to operationalize the good faith standard with-
out regard to why parties might want to allocate quantity discre-
tion to one of them. The Official Comments provide some indica-
tion of what is meant by good faith: the amount demanded in a
requirements contract cannot be disproportionate to estimates.2 1
There is some dispute as to whether the disproportion rule applies
only to increased demands or whether it is symmetrical. The
asymmetry of the rule in some jurisdictions is justified by the
simple arithmetic fact that the downward discretion is bounded by
zero.2 The second aspect of good faith memorialized in the Offi-
19. 132 N.E. 148 (N.Y. 1921).
20. As I have shown elsewhere, the contract did actually put limits on the buyer's dis-
cretion, but the seller failed to invoke the limits. See GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at ch. 3.
21. U.C.C. § 2-306 cmt. 3 (1972).
22. See Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1343 (7th Cir. 1988).
The court found that the buyer's cutting its requirements to zero could be in good faith, but
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cial Comments is the notion that a buyer cannot reduce or elimi-
nate its requirements merely because it would otherwise lose
money.23
Parties do not, however, get unbounded discretion. The re-
quirements are normally tied to a particular purpose. For exam-
ple, a buyer might take all the coal necessary to run a particular
power plant. Or a buyer might limit its requirements to a particu-
lar purpose. The limits could be made tighter by incorporating a
maximum and/or a minimum. Those limits could be further de-
fined over various time periods. The buyer might agree, for exam-
ple, to take a maximum of 400 tons per week and a minimum of
25,000 tons over three years.24 Within those constraints, discre-
tion can be further limited so that the counterparty's reliance can
be accounted for. The contract allocates flexibility to the party
that values it most. If the value of that flexibility exceeds the
counterparty's cost of providing it, there is room for a deal. The
counterparty bears the cost of providing that flexibility, and the
contract can convey that information to the seller by, in effect, im-
posing a price. The price need not be explicit.
There are many ways to price flexibility. There are, for exam-
ple, a number of variations on a "take-or-pay" contract. The party
with discretion might have to pay a stand-by fee, or it might prom-
ise to pay for a minimum quantity--either 100% of the contract
price or some fraction thereof. In a take-or-pay contract, the buyer
agrees to pay for a certain percentage of the specified quantity,
that the burden of proving that its decision was in good faith was on the defendant and that
it had failed to do so. Id.
23. Comment 2 reads:
Under this Article, a contract for output or requirements is not too indefinite since it
is held to mean the actual good faith output or requirements of the particular party.
Nor does such a contract lack mutuality of obligation since, under this section, the
party who will determine quantity is required to operate his plant or conduct his
business in good faith and according to commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade so that his output or requirements will approximate a reasonably foreseeable
figure. Reasonable elasticity in the requirements is expressly envisaged by this sec-
tion and good faith variations from prior requirements are permitted even when the
variation may be such as to result in discontinuance. A shut-down by a requirements
buyer for lack of orders might be permissible when a shut-down merely to curtail
losses would not. The essential test is whether the party is acting in good faith. Simi-
larly, a sudden expansion of the plant by which requirements are to be measured
would not be included within the scope of the contract as made but normal expansion
undertaken in good faith would be within the scope of this section.
U.C.C. § 2-306 cmt. 2 (1972).
24. Those limitations were included in Lake River's contract with Carborundum. See
Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Victor P.
Goldberg, Cleaning Up Lake River, 3 VA. L. & Bus. REV., 427-45 (2008).
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regardless of whether or not the buyer actually takes it. The price
for the first, say, 20% of the product in any given month is, in ef-
fect, zero. If the value of the seller's plant is contingent on the
continued purchases by the buyer, the guaranteed "take" is one
way to protect the seller's reliance. The greater the reliance, other
things equal, the higher the guaranteed payment will be. The
seller's reliance need not, in general, be fully protected-that is,
the parties can share the risk of a bad outcome by setting the sum
of the guaranteed payments below the seller's costs if the buyer
were to order less than the minimum. Parties could include liqui-
dated damages if the buyer were to fail to take a minimum
amount; there would be, of course, the risk that a court would find
that the liquidated damages were a penalty and would refuse to
enforce the clause (that is another doctrine that has outlasted its
sell-by date).
To illustrate the confusion caused by UCC § 2-306(1), consider
the leading case in New York, Feld v. Henry S. Levy & Sons, Inc.25
Levy baked and sold rye bread.26 Inevitably, there would be some
waste product-imperfect loaves and unsold bread-which Levy
had to dispose of. The bakery decided to install an oven to convert
these into breadcrumbs, which had some commercial value. 27 To
ensure prompt removal, it entered into a one-year, full-output con-
tract with Feld, a seller of breadcrumbs. 28 To protect its reliance
interest, Levy required that Feld obtain a "faithful performance"
bond.29 Because Feld had other sources of breadcrumbs, the con-
tract put no constraints on Levy's discretion. Levy was concerned
with producing bread and, not surprisingly, did not want the tail
of its waste product determining how much it should produce.
That is, if Levy decided to produce no breadcrumbs, nothing in the
written agreement prevented it from doing so. Levy was disap-
pointed with the results and, after failing to renegotiate the con-
tract price, dismantled the oven and ceased producing bread-
crumbs." Dismantling the oven did not amount to termination of
the agreement since Levy was required to give six months notice;
had it reinstalled the oven, it would still have been obliged to de-
25. 335 N.E.2d 320 (N.Y. 1975).
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liver the crumbs to Feld. Feld sued for breach, arguing that Levy
could not in good faith reduce its output to zero.3'
The Court of Appeals held that, despite the contract language,
the seller was not free to decide whether it should produce any
breadcrumbs at all. 32 The implied duty of good faith required that
it continue to produce breadcrumbs "even if there be no profit. In
circumstances such as these and without more, defendant would
be justified, in good faith, in ceasing production of the single item
prior to cancellation only if its losses from continuance would be
more than trivial, which, overall, is a question of fact."3 3 The court
gave no indication as to how a jury could determine that fact.
More significantly, it gave no reason for making the outcome de-
pend upon that fact. The court failed to recognize that Levy was
the one making an investment-the toaster oven-in reliance up-
on the contract. The cost to Feld of granting the discretion was
zero. The court, in effect, held that Levy promised that it would
be willing to lose some money-but not too much-in order to pro-
tect Feld's non-existent reliance. The contract priced Levy's dis-
cretion at zero; the court trumped it for no good reason.
The essential point is that good faith, unguided by any under-
standing of the business sense of the transaction, is too blunt an
instrument. Courts should start with the presumption that com-
mercial parties are capable of balancing the quantity discretion
against the counterparty's reliance. The role of good faith can be
limited to cases involving opportunistic behavior. I recognize that
there would be disputes as to what constitutes opportunistic be-
havior, but at least it suggests a broader range of acceptable be-
havior than that embodied in the Code and its Comments.
There remain a few other items on my wish list. I would like to
see a more sensible resolution of the battle of the forms3 4 than the
knockout rule; I have proposed what I believe to be a more sensi-
ble rule-the "best shot" rule." That would at least force parties,
when drafting their forms, to take account of the concerns of their
counterparties. I would also like to see the resurrection of the
"tacit assumption" approach to the question of the recovery of con-
sequential damages. I take some solace from the fact that the
House of Lords did finally recognize the tacit allocation of risks in
31. Id.
32. Id. at 323.
33. Id.
34. U.C.C. § 2-207 (2002).
35. See GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at ch. 8.
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rejecting a claim for consequential damages in The Achilleas."
Further down the wish list, I would like to see that, in the event
that contract performance is excused (impossibility, impracticabil-
ity, frustration), the default rule should be that the parties are left
where they were at the moment the excusing event occurred. The
current default rule of restitution of prepayments possibly offset
by reliance expenditures "if necessary to avoid injustice"37 has lit-
tle to recommend it. Since parties almost always contract out of
the default, it does not do much harm. But the rule's emphasis on
justice and fairness is out of step with the commercial needs of
parties.
36. Transfield Shipping Inc. v. Mercator Shipping Inc. (The Achilleas), [20081 UKHL
48, [2009] 1 A.C. (H.L.) [61] (appeal taken from Eng.). For analysis of the decision and the
tacit assumption approach, see Victor P. Goldberg, The Achilleas: Forsaking Foreseeability,
66 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 107, 130 (2013).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 272, 377 (1974).
Vol. 52334
